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Constitutivism is the view that we can justify fundamental normative claims by showing that agents 
become committed to these claims merely in virtue of  acting.  Constitutivists aspire to show that 
action has structural features—constitutive aims, principles, or standards—that are present in each 
instance of  action and that generate substantive normative conclusions.  In showing that the 
authority of  fundamental normative claims is sourced in our own actions, constitutivists hope to 
avoid familiar objections to justificatory projects in ethics.   
 
This essay provides a very brief  overview of  constitutivism. Section one outlines the basic structure 
of  constitutivism.  Sections two and three examine how the constitutive feature would generate 
normative results.  Section four considers an objection to the constitutivist theory.  Section five 
distinguishes between constitutivist theories that attempt to provide fully general accounts of  
normativity and more modest versions.  Section six asks how much normative content constitutivist 
theories are supposed to generate.  Section seven concludes.  
 
 
1.  The basic structure of  constitutivism 
 
First, a word on constitutivism’s origin.  Constitutivism can be seen as emerging in response to 
concerns about the relationship between normative claims and facts about the agents to whom they 
apply.  Beginning in the mid-seventies, this was one of  the focal points for writings on ethics. J.L. 
Mackie’s influential argument from queerness prompted some of  these debates.  Mackie wrote: “an 
objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of  any 
contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just 
because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it” (Mackie 1977: 40).  It’s mysterious what 
this property could be.  On the basis of  these sorts of  reflections, Bernard Williams (1979) argued 
that an agent has a reason to X only if  there is a “sound deliberative route” from the agent’s 
subjective motivational set to X-ing.  These claims spawned an enormous literature, with 
philosophers falling into two broad camps: externalists claim, and internalists deny, the following 
claim: 
 
An agent A can have a reason to X even if  A does not have, and would not have after 
procedurally rational deliberation, a motive whose fulfillment would be promoted by X-ing.   
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Each side of  the debate has costs.  Briefly, internalists have difficulty establishing genuinely universal 
normative claims, such as “you have reason not to murder.”  After all, it seems possible for an agent 
to lack any motives that are suitably connected to not murdering.  Externalism vouchsafes universal 
normative claims, makes it less obvious how these claims connect to motivation: by hypothesis, 
some of  them will be entirely disconnected from the agent’s actual motives.1 This can make reasons 
look, as Mackie puts it, decidedly queer. 
 
In response to these debates, externalists and internalists attempted to diagnose problems with one 
another’s views.  Attempts at synthesis emerged, with Michael Smith (1994) arguing that we should 
reconfigure the debate in terms of  what an idealized, perfectly rational version of  the self  would 
desire, and John McDowell urging a focus on the phronimos (McDowell 1995).  Meanwhile, Neo-
Kantian theories developed by Barbara Herman (1993), Christine Korsgaard (1996), and others tried 
to reconcile universal and categorical demands with the idea that these demands issue from the 
agent herself.   
 
Constitutivism can be seen as a new entry in these well-worn debates.  For constitutivism operates 
by showing that action or agency has features that generate universal normative commitments.  
Although the details vary, there are two general strategies: an aim-based version of  constitutivism and 
a principle-based version.  The aim-based version tries to show that there is an aim present in every 
episode of  action, and then argues that the aim generates normative reasons; the principle-based 
version tries to show that each action is governed by a particular normative principle.  Let me 
explain. 
 
I’ll begin with the aim-based version.  We can define constitutive aims as follows: 
 
(Constitutive Aim) Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. A constitutively aims at 
G iff  
(i) each token of A aims at G, and  
(ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A.   
 
The clearest examples of  activities with constitutive aims are games.  Take chess.  Arguably, chess 
has the constitutive aim of  checkmate: every token of  chess-playing aims at checkmate, and aiming 
at checkmate is part of  what constitutes a token action as an episode of  chess-playing.2  In other 
words, if  you’re moving chess pieces about on a board without aiming at checkmate, you’re not 
playing chess; and if  you are moving pieces about on a board while aiming at checkmate, this is part 
of  what makes your movements count as episodes of  chess-playing.   
 
The constitutivist about action hopes to show that action itself  has a constitutive aim.  This is, of  
course, counterintuitive. Why think that action has any constitutive features whatsoever?  It’s clear 
enough the activities such as chess have constitutive features.  But that’s not surprising: chess is a 
game, defined by its rules, with clear criteria of  success and failure.  How could we show that action 
itself  has constitutive features? 
 
                                                            
1 I discuss these points in more detail in Katsafanas 2013. 
2 Actually, this is a bit of a simplification: you can also play chess while aiming to attain a draw.  So, to be precise, we 
should say that the constitutive aim of chess-playing is attaining checkmate or a draw.  But, in order to avoid clunky 
formulations, I’ll ignore this complication above.  It does not affect any of the arguments.  
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David Velleman tries to show that action has a constitutive aim of  self-understanding: in each case 
of  action, the agent aims to attain understanding of  what she is doing and why (Velleman 2009).  
Christine Korsgaard argues that action has a constitutive principle of  self-constitution, where self-
constitution is secured by acting on the categorical imperative (Korsgaard 2009).  And I argue that 
action has two constitutive aims.  First, action constitutively aims at a form of  reflective approval: in 
deliberative action, I aim to perform actions of  which I approve, where this approval is stable upon 
the revelation of  further information about the way in which the action is motivated.  Second, action 
constitutively aims at challenge-seeking, in the sense that each episode of  action aims not merely at 
some determinate goal, but also at the encountering and overcoming of  challenges in the pursuit of  
that goal (Katsafanas 2013).   
 
Of  course, each of  these arguments is controversial: you wouldn’t just glance at action and conclude 
that it aims at self-understanding, for example.  So each theory requires a foundation in an account 
of  intentional action that is independently plausible.  If  we just assert, for example, that action is 
movement governed by the Categorical Imperative, then Korsgaard’s account would follow.  But this 
would be of  no interest; all the work would be done by the initial assertion.  Thus, constitutivists 
typically aspire to begin with some very minimal, widely accepted account of  intentional action, and 
show that this minimal account entails that action has a constitutive feature. 
 
The most powerful version of  constitutivism would start with an absolutely uncontroversial account 
of  action and show that it yields a constitutive feature. For example, suppose we can start with the 
idea that action is goal-directed movement, and show that this entails that action has a constitutive 
aim of  self-constitution.  That would be of  enormous interest; nearly everyone accepts the initial 
account of  action, so, if  the arguments work, it would follow that everyone should accept the 
constitutivist’s conclusions.  But suppose, by contrast, that we must start with a more substantive 
and controversial account of  action.  Then, even if  the constitutivist’s arguments work, they will 
only be as powerful as the arguments for the initial theory of  action.  For example, if  Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism starts with the assumption that action aims at governance by the Categorical 
Imperative, then all the work is done by the initial defense of  the conception of  action.  (I’ve argued 
elsewhere that something like this is true: both Velleman and Korsgaard present themselves as 
starting with minimal and almost universally accepted accounts of  action, but, in fact, their 
arguments equivocate; they end up relying on substantive, highly controversial, and under-motivated 
accounts of  action.) 
 
So how do the constitutivist arguments begin?  In each case, the theories begin with a relatively 
uncontroversial account of  action and then proceed to argue that the uncontroversial account yields 
surprising conclusions: 
 
-  Korsgaard begins by claiming that action is simply movement attributable to the whole 
agent, rather than to some part of  the agent (2009: 18).  She then argues that an action is 
attributable to a whole agent only if  the agent acts on a normative principle (2009: 119-120); 
that different normative principles engender different degrees of  agential unity (2009: 120-
179); that the Categorical Imperative is the only principle that fully unifies us (2009: 169-
177); and, finally, that it follows that the Categorical Imperative is the constitutive principle 
of  agency. 
   
-  Velleman begins by claiming that action is immediately known, in the sense that agents 
have non-observational knowledge of  what they are doing and why they are doing it 
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(Velleman 1989).  He then argues that we can best account for the presence of  this 
immediate knowledge by positing that agents have a standing desire for self-understanding, 
which inclines them to act in ways that they antecedently expect to act (as he puts it, “the 
agent attains contemporaneous knowledge of  his actions by attaining anticipatory 
knowledge of  them” (2004: 277).  On this basis, he argues that action constitutively aims at 
self-understanding. 
 
- I begin with two claims: that we aim to perform actions of  which we approve and that we 
aim not only to attain end states, but also to manifest particular forms of  activity.  That latter 
claim is based on a fact about human motivation: in addition to desires for particular objects, 
we are motivated by drives.  Drives are characterized by their aims: the sex drive aims at 
sexual activity, the aggressive drive at aggressive activity.  Drives incline us to seek objects 
upon which to vent this activity, but the objects can be adventitious; the essential thing is the 
expression of  the aim.  I argue that drives operating in this way, continuously generating 
objects of  desire, can be understood as inducing an aim of  seeking to encounter and 
overcome certain types of  resistances.  Moreover, I argue that in deliberative action, we take 
the outcome of  deliberation to settle what we are going to do; and this involves assessing an 
outcome as preferable to others; and this involves aspiring to approve of  what you do; and, 
this involves seeking for the approval to be stable in the fact of  further information about 
the motivational inputs to our deliberation.  From this, I argue, we can derive a constitutive 
aim of  agential activity.  Coupling it with the first aim, we get the following structure: action 
constitutively aims at selecting activities such that they involve overcoming challenges that 
induce resistances; and, in light of  the first aim, we’re committed to approving of  this aim, as 
something that structures all of  our actions.  (See Katsafanas 2013 for the details.)   
 
These are just sketches and probably raise as many questions as they answer.  But my hope is that 
they give some indication of  how the constitutivist argues: we start with an independently plausible 
account of  action and try to show that it yields substantive normative conclusions.  
 
2.  The reasons generated by the constitutive feature 
 
Suppose we can in fact show that action has a constitutive aim.  What would follow from this?  The 
fact that action has some constitutive aim is a merely descriptive premise; how do we get normativity 
from this? 
 
This brings us to the second step of  the constitutivist project: showing how constitutive features 
generate reasons.  I’ve suggested that the constitutivist should defend a principle of  the following 
form: 
 
(Success) If X aims at G, then G is a standard of success for X, such that G generates 
normative reasons for action.  
 
Returning to the chess example: if  chess has a constitutive aim of  checkmate, then by Success 
players will be committed to treating checkmate as providing them with reasons for action.  Success 
should be understood as a fully general claim about aims: if  you have an aim, then all else being 
equal you have normative reasons to fulfill it.  For example, if  Nolan aims at eating cake and Franny 
doesn’t, then all else being equal Nolan has a reason that Franny lacks: a reason to eat cake.  (I’ll 
consider objections below.) 
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If  we accept something like Success, then reasons are fairly cheap: any aim will generate prima facie 
reasons.  What’s interesting about the reasons generated by the constitutive aim, though, is that they 
would have universal scope.  They would apply to agents just in virtue of  the fact that they are 
performing actions.  Just as the chess player’s reason to promote checkmate arises from the nature 
of  the game and thus applies independently of  his contingent psychological preferences, so too the 
agent’s reason to realize action’s constitutive aim would arise from the nature of  agency as such and 
would thus apply independently of  her contingent psychological states.  So the reasons derived from 
the constitutive aim would be universal.  Many philosophers regard this as a criterion of  adequacy 
for ethical theories. 
 
But should we accept something like Success?  Although Velleman (2009) and I (Katsafanas 2013) 
defend versions of  it, it’s not entirely uncontroversial.  After all, we might deny that aims generate 
reasons.  This skepticism is sometimes motivated by reluctance to say that aiming at reprehensible 
activities, such as murder, provides one with a reason to murder.  Accordingly, we might think that 
aims generate reasons only if  we antecedently have reason to adopt the aim; or we might deny any 
connection whatsoever between aims and reasons.  However, I’ve elsewhere argued that the standard 
ways of  arguing against principles like Success in fact present no difficulties for the constitutivist.  
While there is not enough space to explain this point fully, I’ll give one example.  Suppose the 
objection to Success is based on Broome-style wide-scope readings of  the instrumental principle.  
Although this might seem problematic, it actually presents the constitutivist with no trouble at all.  It 
merely requires a reformulation of  Success in something like this form: Rationality requires that if 
you have an end G, then [either you give up this end or you take the necessary and available means 
to G]. 3 Reformulating Success in terms of rational requirements won’t bother the constitutivist, as 
the constitutive aim of won’t be capable of being abandoned; thus, one rationality will require that 
you take the necessary and available means to attaining it.  Analogous arguments are available for 
other standard interpretations of the relationship between aims, goals and reasons (see Katsafanas 
2013, Chapter 2 for the details).  
 
If  we’re terribly skeptical about these responses, though, a second variant of  constitutivism is 
available.  Recall the distinction between aim and principle based versions of  constitutivism.  Rather 
than arguing that action has a constitutive aim and trying to show that the aim generates reasons, we 
could directly argue for the presence of  a normative feature in action.  Christine Korsgaard pursues 
this strategy.  To simplify a bit, suppose we accept a roughly Kantian account of  action according to 
which action is movement governed by the Categorical Imperative.  Then each instance of  action 
would be governed by the Categorical Imperative, and being governed by the Categorical Imperative 
would be part of  what makes an event qualify as an action.  So the Categorical Imperative would be 
the constitutive principle of  action.  Moreover, we would not need a second step to establish the 
normativity of  this principle: the principle already contains normative content.   
 
I’ve argued elsewhere that we should see the aim-based version of  constitutivism as roughly 
Humean, and the norm-based version as Kantian (Katsafanas 2013).  The aim-based version 
establishes the universality of  a particular aim in action, and then appeals to some independent 
principle for generating reasons from this aim.  The principle-based version argues directly for a 
normative notion of  action.  Accordingly, the theories will face objections at different points, as I’ll 
explain below.   
                                                            




3.  The status of  the reasons generated by the constitutive feature 
 
I’ve mention one desideratum for an ethical theory: that it provide universal reasons.  But some 
philosophers also seek to show that ethics generates overriding reasons.  Suppose action has a 
constitutive feature (an aim or a principle) that yields normative reasons.  Notice that it does not 
immediately follow that the reasons derived from the constitutive feature are overriding.  Return to 
the chess example. Chess players have reason to checkmate their opponents, but other reasons will 
also be present: the player may aspire to enjoy the game, let’s say, and therefore have reason to do 
what promotes enjoyment.  And she may have reason to try out some new strategy, rather than 
taking the most direct and obvious route to checkmate.  These reasons may lead her to make 
different choices than she would if  they were absent.   
 
So the reasons derived from the constitutive aim interact with the reasons arising from other 
sources.  But the reasons derived from the constitutive aim do have a special status: the constitutive 
aim can’t be abandoned without abandoning the activity.  You can’t fully disengage from it.  You can, 
however, disengage from the other sources of  reasons: you can’t give up the aim of  checkmate 
without ceasing to play chess, but you can give up the aim of  enjoyment or of  trying out a new 
strategy.   
 
In this sense, the reasons derived from the constitutive aim are inescapable, whereas the reasons 
derived from other sources are escapable.  Thus, constitutivism generates an inescapable normative 
standard while allowing all other standards to be escapable.   
 
Of  course, the constitutive feature is escapable in one sense: we can stop participating in the activity 
governed by the constitutive aim.  I can stop playing chess, for example, and thereby escape any 
reasons generated by chess’ constitutive features.  But notice that action itself  is crucially different.  
Suppose a constitutivist can establish that action itself  has some constitutive aim.  Certainly, agents 
could escape this aim by ceasing to perform intentional actions.  They can go to sleep, for example.  
But, given that ethical theory aspires to provide norms for intentional action, constitutivism provides 
reasons with a scope as wide as that of  ethical theory.  The reasons derived from the constitutive 
aim of  action would be inescapable for those performing intentional actions.   
 
But it still does not follow that the reasons derived from the constitutive aim are weightier than 
other reasons.  Nor does it follow that the reasons generated by the constitutive feature are 
particularly substantive.  In principle, it’s possible that constitutivism generates only weak and always 
overridden reasons.  So we’ll have to say more about the status of  these reasons.  Some 
constitutivists, like Korsgaard, want to show that constitutivism justifies most of  the content of  
modern morality; others, like Velleman and I, think it can’t do that, but can yield a number of  
interesting normative results.  I’ll explore these possibilities below.  
 
 
4. Can we be alienated from the constitutive feature? 
 
But there’s also a different reason for worrying about the attempt to anchor normativity in 
inescapable features of  agency. After all, can’t you be moved by the constitutive aim, and regard it as 
inescapable, while being alienated from it?  It certainly is possible to deplore aims that figure in wide 
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swathes of  agency: consider the way in which religious ascetics respond to desires for material 
comfort, sexual pleasure, and so forth.  They may regard these aims as ineradicable, but nonetheless 
contend against them. The constitutive aim would be a bit different: even though desires for 
comfort and sex are widespread, they are not omnipresent; they are not aims that are manifest in 
every episode of  action.  So the person who deplored the constitutive aim would be even more 
radical than the ascetic.  Nevertheless, can’t we take the same attitude toward constitutive features, 
coherently deploring an omnipresent aim?   
 
Some constitutivists recognize this difficult and try to respond to it.  Velleman, for example, claims 
that the constitutive aim of  self-understanding is deliberatively self-validating: “even if  we all of  us 
share this aim… you can still ask whether we ought to have it, and why.  To my ear, this question 
sounds like a demand for self-understanding… So interpreted, the question demands that the 
constitutive aim of  action be justified in relation to the criterion set by the aim itself.  Such a 
justification is easy to give…” (Velleman 2009: 138).  In other words, if  action constitutively aims at 
self-understanding, then asking why we ought to have and fulfill this aim is a request for self-
understanding: it is a request that presupposes the very aim that it questions.  In that sense, Velleman 
claims, it is self-validating: any attempt to question it will already presuppose it.  So alienation from 
the constitutive aim isn’t possible (or at least isn’t coherent).   
 
I attempt a different answer.  As I see it, one of  the constitutive aims of  agency is approving of  
one’s action while aiming that this approval be stable in the face of  further information about the 
action’s etiology.  If  every episode of  action contains a second constitutive feature—call it F—then 
F will be part of  the etiology of  each action.  Thus, insofar as one meets the first constitutive 
condition, one will aspire to meet the second: insofar as one aims to approve of  one’s action in light 
of  further information about the action’s etiology, and insofar as F is part of  each action’s etiology, 
the agent will be committed to taking F’s presence as not undermining her approval of  the action.  
So the agent is left with two options: deplore action as such, or approve of  the constitutive feature.  
There are only two fully coherent responses: total rejection or total acceptance.  Or so, at any rate, I 
argue (Katsafanas 2013). 
 
Regardless of  whether these strategies work, the constitutivist does need to say something about the 
possibility of  alienation from or rejection of  the constitutive aim. 
 
5. Does constitutivism provide a fully general account of  normativity? 
 
Constitutivism operates by identifying a constitutive feature of  agency which is then taken to 
generate substantive normative conclusions.  But this is just a schema, identifying a type of  ethical 
theory.  There are many ways of  instantiate these features.  
 
A central dimension on which constitutivist theories vary concerns their aspirations: the 
constitutivist can attempt to provide a fully general account of  normativity or a more localized 
account.  Korsgaard, for example, tries to offer an account of  normativity as such: she writes that 
“the only way to establish the authority of  any purported normative principle is to establish that it is 
constitutive of  something to which the person whom it governs is committed—something that she 
either is doing or has to do… The laws of  logic govern our thoughts because if  we don’t follow 
them we just aren’t thinking… the laws of  practical reason govern our actions because if  we don’t 
follow them we just aren’t acting…” (Korsgaard 2009: 32).  So, according to Korsgaard, both 
 8 
practical and theoretical normativity must be accounted for in terms of  constitutive features; 
anything less would be a failure. 
 
Some philosophers have mistakenly taken this to be an essential component of  the constitutivist 
project.  Matthew Silverstein, for example, writes that principles such as Success cannot succeed, 
“for they draw on the explicitly normative principle that one has a reason (or is at least rationally 
required) to achieve or promote one’s aims or ends. The whole point of  constitutivism is to derive 
action’s standard of  correctness from non-normative facts about the nature of  agency. Action’s 
constitutive norm is supposed to be the foundation of  all practical normative authority… And so it 
cannot rely on some other norm for justification…” (Silverstein 2016: 233). 
 
Now, Silverstein is right about Korsgaard: as the quotation above demonstrates, she thinks that 
constitutivism is the only possible justificatory strategy in ethics.  But Silverstein is wrong that the 
“whole point of  constitutivism” is to provide a foundation for all normativity.  We needn’t be 
committed to this maximally ambitious version of  constitutivism; less ambitious versions, which 
seek to secure incontestable sources of  practical normative authority, without thereby trying to secure 
all sources, would still yield substantial and distinctive results.  After all, we could treat constitutive 
aims as one source of  normativity among others.  There would be nothing incoherent about 
combining constitutivism with realism: we could hold that certain norms arise from constitutive 
features, whereas others are just irreducible normative truths.  Or we could combine constitutivism 
with a Humean account: we could hold that there is some function from our actual or hypothetical 
subjective motivational states to reasons, while also endorsing the constitutivist schema.  My 
constitutivist account—and, if  I understand it, Velleman’s—takes this latter form.  The interest of  
constitutivism would then lie in its ability to generate inescapable reasons, rather than (as for 
Korsgaard) all reasons.   
 
It may be helpful to offer a more concrete illustration of  the way in which a constitutivist could treat 
constitutivism as a source of  some, but not all, reasons.  Consider the instrumental principle.  This is 
the best candidate for a constitutive feature of  agency: if  anything is constitutive of  agency, this is.  
Action is bringing things about.  To bring things about requires that you take the necessary and 
available means.  So, insofar as we are aiming to bring things about, we are aiming at taking the 
necessary and available means to bringing them about.  More precisely:  
 
  (1)  An agent’s A-ing is an action iff in A-ing the agent aims to bring about some end. 
(2)  An agent aims to bring about an end iff the agent aims to take some of the necessary and 
available means to this end.   
(3)  Therefore, an agent’s A-ing is an action iff in A-ing the agent aims to take some of the 
necessary and available means to her end.   
 
From (3), it follows that taking the necessary and available means to one’s ends is a constitutive aim 
of  action.  If  we accept Success, this entails a version of  the instrumental principle.   
 
But, Silverstein objects, have we really shown that there’s a reason for taking the means to your ends?  
No, he thinks: the mere fact that I inescapably aim at X doesn’t yet entail that I have a reason for 
trying to attain X.  To establish that—to move from claims about inescapable aims to claims about 
reasons—we have to make substantive normative assumptions. 
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I think here we reach bedrock.  One type of  philosopher says: even if  you have some inescapable 
aim, even if  the aim is present in everything you do, you can still ask whether you have a reason for 
pursuing the aim.  And another type of  philosopher says: that’s nonsense.  When you ask whether 
you have a reason for A-ing, you’re asking whether you should pursue A.  But in the constitutive 
case, the question is idle.  There’s no alternative to A-ing.  So your question about whether there’s a 
reason to A, although it has the grammatical form of  a question, is moot.  Inescapability is the 
fundamental form of  normativity.  When you’re asking about normativity, you’re asking whether you 
should pursue something; an appropriate answer to that question is showing that you cannot do 
anything but pursue the thing.  (For a more detailed treatment of  this point, see Katsafanas 2013: 
Chapter Two.) 
 
But suppose we’re philosophers of  the first type: we insist that we can question whether there’s a 
reason to act on inescapable aims.  Then we have to rest content with the idea that constitutivism 
relies on a further normative principle specifying that there’s a reason or a rational requirement to 
take the means to your ends.  Constitutivism so interpreted wouldn’t be a fully general account of  
normativity.  But in response, I’m tempted to say: so what?  If  we can show that our derivation of  
practical normativity relies on the assumption that we have reason or a rational requirement to take 
the means to our ends, then we’re still in far better shape than other ethical theories.  What’s 
worrying and controversial about ethics are questions about substantive goods: we want to know 
whether we have reason to reject inequality; whether we have reason to strive for some forms of  life 
and avoid others; whether cruelty is wrong; whether compassion good; and so on.  What worries 
many of  us is that these claims might be unjustifiable.  But if  they’re justifiable so long as we accept 
the claim that we have reason or rational requirements to take the means to our ends, then the 
concerns are far less pressing.  I, for one, would welcome an ethical theory that actually showed that 
insofar as you’re committed to instrumental rationality, you’re committed to treating slavery, cruelty, 
and so forth as wrong.  The maximally ambitious, Korsgaardian version of  constitutivism has a 
certain appeal.  But it’s not all or nothing: less ambitious, Humean version of  constitutivism still 
establish substantive and important results.   
 
6. How much content is derivable from constitutivism? 
 
I’ll close with a related point. Some constitutivists aspire to show that we can derive something like 
traditional bourgeois morality from the constitutive features of  agency; others aspire to show only 
that some substantive norms are derivable.  Korsgaard is in the first camp: she claims that we can 
derive “Enlightenment morality” from the constitutive features of  action (Korsgaard 1996: 123), 
where “Enlightenment morality” seems to be roughly coextensive with the moral claims typically 
embraced by contemporary, liberal, highly educated classes in the urban US and Europe.  Velleman 
denies this, holding instead that we can give a constitutive account of  various norms that “favor 
morality without guaranteeing or requiring it” (Velleman 2009: 149).  My own version of  
constitutivism is closer to Velleman than to Korsgaard: I think we can derive certain principles that 
enable us to assess competing evaluative and normative claims, but these principles do not result in 
the justification of  a unique ethical view (Katsafanas 2013).  So Velleman and I think that 
constitutivism enables us to rule out some ethical views, and to recommend others, but not to reach 
a justification of  a single ethical view.  
 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
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I’ve given a very brief  overview of  the constitutivist strategy, discussed some ways in which the 
constitutivist theories vary, and offered clarifications in response to standard objections and 
confusions.  While much work remains to be done, I hope this essay gives an indication of  how 
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